Wednesday, 8 April 2015

You SSK thing

Today I'd like to continue the theme I've been harping on recently about UK defence in the context of just pure defence, i.e. protecting the UK, without any concern for foreign adventures and UN missions etc. Putin is the new black these days and everyone seems to think the UK should suddenly be re-arming ready for world war three because... Russia. So an interesting topic at such times would be - I think at least - the issue of conventionally powered submarines.

The UK's last foray into this world ended with the Upholder-class diesel powered subs, which served for a grand total of four years in the early nineties before being decommissioned and sold off as part of the "peace dividend" (the dividend that just keeps giving....). Since then it's been all nuclear for the UK, in ever decreasing numbers which in the case of the Astute-class seems likely to come to rest at seven. Meanwhile the rest of the world has somewhat embraced the concept of the conventional submarine due to the lower construction and running costs, accepting a trade off in many performance measures vs a nuclear submarine in exchange for the ability to at least play in the game, and understanding that even conventional submarines represent a formidable foe for surface vessels when properly handled. Stories abound about European operated conventional subs sinking entire US carrier battle groups on exercises. Even if the exact details of each of these incident might tell a different story to the one that appears in the various press releases, it would be foolish to assume that despite quite a lot smoke there is absolutely no question of there being fire.

The UK reluctance to invest in such a capability has its own merits. Question one; where would you build them? Barrow is tied up building the Astutes and planning for the successor class to the Vanguard SSBNs. Question two; what would the UK do with them? Nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) have been the favourite for a while now due in large part to their exceptional range and speed. They are Fisher's dreadnoughts for the 21st century. Endurance and speed that a conventional submarine can't hope to match.

Well, as the Russian bear rising seems to be the flavour of the month right now then actually the conventional sub seems to make a lot of sense. From the Royal Navy's perspective the biggest concern in relation to the Russian Navy in some hypothetical future war is probably the dual threat of Russian submarines and surface groups penetrating into the Atlantic and disrupting supply lines with the US, while also threatening the UK deterrent. To do this the Russians would have to make their way through the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. Now in days of yore the UK used to be able to help protect this gap with its maritime patrol aircraft but whoops, budget crisis, MPA no more. But protecting and patrolling this gap - and indeed the surrounding UK waters - is right up the street of a conventional sub (Henceforth SSK, to save me having to keep typing "conventional sub").

The mission plays perfectly to the strengths of the SSK as a slow but virtually silent ambush predator. Whispering back and forth through local areas of interest to the UK, the SSK would provide a powerful tool in the Royal Navy's underwater arsenal, while the SSNs roared about the open oceans. As far as purchasing some of these goes, a UK new build, homegrown design would obviously offer tailor made advantages as well as being a potential source of exports given the current popularity of these kind of subs, but a foreign buy would be more likely. Given the low(er) cost of SSKs in comparison to an SSN it shouldn't break the bank to purchase a few and there is certainly plenty of competition on the market place right now, from the German Type 212, to the French Scorpene and Swedish Gotland-class.

If we're all really serious about this "the Russians are coming" narrative that has developed lately then to me a small fleet of SSKs seems a highly logical choice.

Thursday, 26 March 2015

NATO and the SDSR. Sort of. Kind of. In two minutes.

So after all that worrying in the end my great Internet blackout lasted all of about 8 hours. Happy days.

Time is short however and so I'm going to condense my thinking down into the shortest possible post. And what I'm thinking is this; with all this hullabaloo over Russia knocking on NATO's door, why not kill two birds with one stone? The two birds being to present a united front against Russia and to facilitate cooperative training among NATO allies. The solution would come from expanding the standing maritime task group concept and create a series of air, land and sea groups within NATO, with member countries rotating units through and rotating command of them. At the same time as providing conventional deterrence and rapid reaction units for various NATO tasks they would also be the core of large(er) scale NATO exercises.

So the Baltic mission could be expanded to a standing air wing with several squadrons rotating through on a regular basis. On the ground there would be perhaps a brigades worth of light infantry, centred on a position where they could provide rapid response across the region. Based in Poland could perhaps be one or two NATO armoured divisions, with countries rotating their armoured brigades through. A NATO air group could also be based in Poland. Romania (spellcheck can f**k off, I know that's correct) could also host one or two divisions, depending probably more on various countries willingness to pitch in than anything else. Perhaps one armoured division and one mountain, to let NATO's mountain warfare forces get a bit of large scale cross training in too. Add air group.

At sea the obvious choices for task groups would be the north sea/north Atlantic, the Baltic sea and the med. The first of those could (re: should) be a real area of interest for the UK, with the ability to host and take the lead in a primarily anti-submarine focused task group, one that would often find itself with access to carrier air cover (eventually) through the new QE-class carriers and provide NATO nations with the chance to gain a tremendous amount of training in open ocean anti-submarine operations, hopefully with some of our local allies pitching in with their non-nuclear subs for training and operations. A sub-group of this could be a NATO amphibious assault division, with various nations pitching in their amphibs (and troops, obviously) for regular exercises in the region. Perhaps the med group would have its own version as well?

And so on and so forth, you get the general idea. Everyone seems very, very concerned about the Russians all of a sudden, while also being very, very concerned about the future of UK strategy. Yet everybody seems to be asking questions and nobody seems to be offering answers. Hopefully this post will jog the discussion towards the answers, which in the UK's case is going to have to involve no mystical pots of money (it's not coming. It's really not) and doing what the UK has always done best; build alliances by pitching in with expertise and manpower (not so much money these days) to get everyone else moving. See Waterloo, Minden, etc, etc, for examples.

Friday, 20 March 2015

The cuts are coming

One basic rule that will always set you in good stead when listening to politicians is this; believe nothing. 

Don't believe the promises. Don't believe the numbers. Don't believe the rhetoric. It's an unfortunate fact that politicians long ago, as in since the dawn of time, gave up on the idea of what was best for their country. Politicians of all eras are at any one time caught up in one of the three stages of politics; expanding power, consolidating power, or clinging to power. They will say and do pretty much whatever it takes to achieve these ends. We all know this. If you don't believe this is how politics works and still believe that there are "some good politicians in parliament" then I strongly suggest you stop kidding yourself. You might say I'm very cynical on the subject but then politicians have had many, many opportunities to prove me wrong and reverse this trend. They have singularly failed to do so at every turn. Case in point is the SNP, who for years have vigorously opposed nuclear weapons on Scottish soil and yet are already back tracking on this issue at Olympic gold medal speed now that they sniff the opportunity to do a political deal with Labour in the event of a hung parliament.

And thus we come to Cameron's promise on no more cuts to the army and the recent budget statement. Lots of people took Cameron for his word when he talked about sticking to 2% of GDP for the armed forces and that the army would face no further cut backs under a future Conservative government. This to me represents a stunning level of naivety (sorry, I can't do the fancy accent characters). Just out of interest let's look at some of Cameron's promises from before the last election. One, a "cast iron guarantee" of a referendum on Europe. Two, no top down reorganisation of the NHS. Three, to balance the budget over the course of the next parliament. Now please point out which of these three election promises were kept? I can wait.

Please don't get bogged down in the ideology of those things. It doesn't matter if you agree with them or not. The issue at hand is promises made that were then broken. The notion that it was all the fault of the Lib Dems because of the coalition is also laughable. So based on this track record, along with the multitude of other U-turns that occurred during the parliament, what basis does anyone have to trust David Cameron when he says that no more cuts are on the way if the Conservatives are re-elected? I would suggest that there is absolutely none. Not a hint of a foundation upon which Mr. Cameron could plausibly claim to be a trustworthy individual.

Then we turn to the budget itself. We know health, education and international aid have all been earmarked for protection from cuts, at least in terms of the face value of their budgets. Given that they all received this "protection" during the course of this parliament, it is reasonable to presume that they would likely retain it going forward. It is also highly unlikely that any other government would target these areas, short of some bizarre turn around where UKIP ends up with absolute control, which is incredibly unlikely. As such any cuts will have to fall elsewhere. And there will have to be cuts. Plenty of them. The coalition is miles off its original target to reduce the public spending deficit by the end of this parliament. Labour are promising a softer decline in public spending to get the books back in balance, but even that would require cuts. Even the most likely course of action, a Labour government propped up by other left wing parties which decides that running a slight budget deficit in the long run isn't such a bad thing if they can spend the money on public goodies (aka the Gordon Brown approach to economics), would still require some cuts to spending. No matter which way you slice the cake, some people are destined to get a smaller portion.

One of those people is the MoD. Don't shake your head, you know it's coming. And if you don't then you had better wake up and smell the coffee pretty soon because it is happening, whether you like it or not. The defence budget is, and always has been, easy prey. It's politically much less volatile to cut than almost all other forms of public spending, with legal aid, agriculture and prisons being perhaps two or three that are easier to get away with. What the armed forces do is typically well away from home, out of sight, out of mind, unlikely in the public's perception to effect them on a day to day basis. It is a ready made pot of money to dip into. Some people will stamp their feet in defiance, but nobody is going to the ballot box to cast a protest vote because they think the UK needs more transport aircraft or minesweepers.

Looking at the economy, growth figures for the UK have been decent, but underlying trends are not great. Despite the governments boasts about rising employment, it's worth noting that the Office for National Statistics (ONS), whose figures are used to trumpet this claim, classifies full time work as anything that goes over 16 hours per week. To me that is a very odd definition of what constitutes full time work. On top of this the number of people turning to self employment to get themselves back into work has grown significantly, but the long term trend of how long these people are able to sustain their self employment is not good. The fact that so many people have had to turn to self employment to get themselves back into work is also a clear indicator of the underlying weakness in the labour market, not least because many of the newly self employed are working on limited hours and for low pay.

Thus any idea that the country will simply grow its way out of this predicament, or that there is some bountiful pot of money sitting on the horizon just waiting to be tapped up, is on very shaky ground. Rising concerns about a lack of growth in Europe and beyond is also likely to hurt the long term prospects of the UK economy. 

The cuts are coming. Prepare thyself.

Wednesday, 11 March 2015

Taking Prisoners

So I recently saw a discussion regarding the Kurdish militias taking ISIS fighters prisoner and the rights or wrongs of the fact that the Kurds treated them (at the very least in front of the cameras) with the respect and dignity that would normally be accorded to opposing soldiers by an army that was a signatory to the Geneva Convention. Some people were outraged that the Kurds did this, some thought it a bit odd, and a handful agreed that it was appropriate.

I would say that I'm on the side that thinks this is appropriate. Now that may seem a barking mad position to take given what ISIS routinely does to its captives. But I think there are two reasons to support this position.

The first is that "an eye for eye" is the sort of knee jerk, ridiculous reaction I would expect of people like ISIS, not those claiming any kind of moral high ground in the contest. It is a fundamental, inescapable fact that if you follow this line of thinking then it will take you down a path that - through a series of slightly convoluted twists and turns - leads you inevitably to the conclusion that Jimmy Saville's children should be raped and/or molested by his victims, because "an eye for an eye" right?

The second is the much more practical purpose of what this approach would do for the Kurdish forces. Anyone fighting against ISIS should by now be under no illusions as to what will happen to them should they be captured by ISIS. Fighting tooth and nail to the last bullet and beyond is their only viable option. To surrender is to sign your own death warrant, and to willingly accept a potentially very gruesome end. 

By comparison ISIS forces have a much less final choice. To surrender to Kurdish forces is to potentially save their lives, at the very least in the short term (I've no idea what the Kurds plan to do in the long run with any prisoners). This not only offers the Kurds the opportunity to end certain fights by offering terms of surrender to ISIS fighters, but it also encourages defection by fighters who don't see a long term future with the group.

As an example, intercepted messages sent back by a number of foreign fighters who travelled to Syria to join ISIS have demonstrated that actually taking part in a Jihad may not be all that they originally though it was cracked up to be. Complaints about being treated as slaves or kitchen skivs, no home comforts etc, have shown that not all ISIS fighters are the hard case Jihadists that they claim to be. As such, offering them a way out by surrendering can be tempting and potentially provides the Kurdish forces (and their western backers) with valuable sources of intelligence that could help hasten the end of the group.

As galling as it may be to watch men who have fought against them - and possibly carried out war crimes - receive water, food, medical care and decent treatment, it seems clear that the Kurdish forces understand that biting their lips and treating their enemy humanely is a long term investment that trades short term frustration for information and in some cases lower friendly casualties.

Sunday, 8 March 2015

Update 08/03/15

Just a quick one to let you all know that due to switching broadband providers I potentially may not have Internet access for a few weeks. It's all in the lap of the telecommunication gods I'm afraid. It might be one day, it might be 14, nobody seems to be able to give me a solid answer. Just a heads up in case things go quiet for a bit.

Wednesday, 4 March 2015

Looking at the strategy

With all the ballyhoo regarding the SDSR coming up this year and everyone debating where the extra (Ha!) money might go, I've been doing some mulling over with a nice glass (or two. And a half. And another f**king half) of Amaretto. Specifically I've been thinking about the Russian "threat", which based on some discussions I've seen you'd be forgiven thinking he was knocking on the door to number 10 right now demanding to come in and make himself comfortable.

It's got me thinking about the history of the UK as it relates to the armed forces. Throughout time the UK has always been able to channel itself against various enemies. At one point it was the French (and to an extent the Spanish). The need was clear; retain an absolute advantage relative to the combined European powers in naval warfare, maintain sufficient garrisons in overseas territories to prevent their capture by hostile powers, maintain a reserve of trained active personnel in the UK ready for immediate global deployment as reinforcements, and maintain a semi-trained "militia" in the UK to hedge against the threat of invasion.

The stragtey was all rather simple in the grand scheme of things. Use the navy to choke off any potential invasion of the UK and to command trade routes overseas, shift the overseas garrisons around as needed (with assistance from UK delivered forces) to fight any small fires abroad, recruit as many locals to help as possible, and divert the enemies attention away from the UK and its interests by providing financial, material and technical support to continental allies.

I've heard this best described as the "Excessive Power" doctrine, i.e. trying to prevent any one continental power from achieveing a position of excessive power over Europe. The results were erm, mixed to say the least. But what was critical about this is not the specifics, but that the UK had a very clear idea about what the major challenge of the day was. Political and military leaders knew, without a shadow of a doubt, that this thing or that was the overarching objective, the primary concern of their day.

And for most of the time between then and 1989 the UK had one enemy or another to focus its attention on, aside from a few dry spells. Which is where we find ourselves today, in something of a dry spell. With Afghanistan at a close and the current operations over Iraq more akin to the inter war strafing of rebellious tribes from the 1920's, the UK is in something of a strategic void.

That's not to say that there are no threats. Just none that are especially fatal to the UK as an entity. 

The UK is no longer the great naval power of the world. The US is. And the UK happens to be allied to the US. The most prominent land power or air power that could threaten the UK is sitting at the other end of the continent, with several other air and land forces between it. Now as a member of NATO that puts the UK under certain obligations to defend its neighbours and indeed the old saying about prevention being better than the cure would apply here. The events of the second world war have shown us what happens when you allow trouble to arrive on the opposite side of the channel.

But then again, how serious really is the Russian threat? Ask yourself this question for example; how likely is it that the Russian hoardes are about to go rampaging across eastern europe? How far would they get before they ran out of men or tanks? More pertinently, how far would they get before they outran their logistics systems? How far would they get before they simply got lost?

So having answered those questions, how much of a threat really is Russia to the UK, beyond the nuisance value of probing our airspace and making angry noises about NATO expansion, keeping in mind that the situation in Ukraine and Crimea was a response to a perceived threat to their borders and their major naval base in the region, something which Russia has form over when it comes to perceived or real encroachement of their sphere of influence?

This for me is the really telling issue when it comes to debating the SDSR. To me it still seems like an exercise in politics and budgets. There is still not really a strategic element to the strategic review. Like all the talk about being prepared to recapture the Falklands if needs be. How about we prepare instead to not lose the Falklands in the first place?

Any time the Type 26 comes up, the debate turns to whether they should be anti-submarine focuses, or whether they should be more generalist global combat ships, or even be replaced in a number of roles by smaller, cheaper patrol vessels. Not much debate seems to take place around what the Type 26 would actually be used for, why we need them, and how many we need to meet the tasks expected, or what even those tasks should be.

Something to mull over your next glass of your favourite tipple.

Monday, 23 February 2015

Look, a new post!

Bonjour mes amies! (My French was always a bit suspect (E or F at GCSE level) so I hope that's right). Apologies for the delay, but such is sometimes the fate of someone who has to blog on the side. Today I just want to briefly touch on the situation in Ukraine. Not the politics or the operational level situation however, but something that amuses me greatly.

Because for many, many years Russia (or rather the Soviet Union) was very skillful in its handling of the Cold War against the United States and its allies. They played the long game for the most part and placed a high value on the return for investment of their decisions. This is exemplified by their support for North Vietnam in the 60's and 70's, which in return for financial, material and training support was able to bog down the US for around 8 years of conventional operations, at the cost of over 58,000 American dead and 153,000 plus wounded, and around $140 billion in financial costs, which equates to about a trillion dollars in today's money.

From the Russian perspective it was a (relatively) low input, high output arrangement, one which they used the world over. Some subsidised equipment and a bit of training could go a long way in terms of securing allies and resources, while at the same time serving as a thorn in the side of the US. But what's interesting about the situation in Ukraine, and why it amuses me so much, is the fact that the tables have been turned on their head to some degree. This of course is subject to accepting the allegations made against Russia that it has been sending soldiers across the border to help the Rebels fight, which still hasn't been proven by the standards that would be required in a UK court ("beyond reasonable doubt"). 

If the allegation is indeed true though then the situation represents a remarkable shift from what was typical of the cold war days (Afghanistan excepted), as Russia now finds itself having to pour manpower into the cauldron to try and shore up the situation while the west finds itself in the enviable position of observing from the sidelines, only having to pass on the odd shipment of non-lethal aid (and probably a few sneaky lethal shipments) to keep things ticking over, as Russia loses more and more diplomatic support by the day and its economy continues to suffer under the triple whammy of sanctions, depressed oil prices and the need to fund its broad day to day military activities.

What doesn't make me chuckle is the idea that western leaders seem so keen to just roll over and give the rebels very generous peace terms. For all the bluster, hysteria, huffing and puffing that's going around, the battle lines remain resolutely quite static and pose very little danger to Ukraine as a whole. There is no real light at the end of the proverbial tunnel for the rebels, at least not through a military solution. Western aid to the Ukrainian government, if stepped up, would at the worst probably just trigger a greater surge by the Russians that would extend the stalemate, and at best allow the Ukrainian forces to make the sort of progress that might just convince Putin to pull out and write the situation off as a lost cause altogether.

One has to think (for one art in posh mode) that if the roles were reversed then the Russians would jump at the chance to bog the old enemy down in a fight which they have very little to gain from. But it also raises an interesting question in this pre-SDSR silly season. With this crisis taking place in Eastern Europe, with ISIS at large in both Syria and Iraq, and now apparently Libya, with the government in Yemen falling to rebel elements, and with Boko Haram causing the Nigerian government no end of problems, is this the right time to expand the UK's capacity for unconventional warfare?

These sorts of situations are after all precisely the sort of thing that the SAS was resurrected to deal with, and a lot of the US Special Forces community owes its existence to the need for unconventional forces during the cold war. In an era of biting cutbacks is there perhaps some more money to be found down the back of the sofa to expand the military's unseen and unadvertised fighting/training ability? And if so, with cuts already having taken place and with more likely on the horizon, where will the military get the manpower for this? As it can't increase the size of the suitable recruitment pool that really only leaves the option of lowering the standards for entry.

Some interesting things to mull over I think.

Tuesday, 10 February 2015

Just a quick moan

Because who doesn't love a good moan on a Tuesday evening am I right?

I followed a link on Twitter to a defence blog I haven't previously seen (Quill or Capture) and I just read this sentence in one of the articles; "His assumption that there is a trend for wars to be fought among the people and that urban operations are the ‘new normal’ seems to be largely accurate."

In this case "his" is relating to Ben Barry, the Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). And here comes my moan; when have wars not been fought among the people and when have urban operations not been the norm?

We like to make a big play about how in the first and second world wars strategic bombing brought the frontline to the people for the first time, but that completely ignores the fact that there are lots of graves filled with the victims of starvation and disease incurred during medieval sieges and the such like (and that's just for starters). Civilian populations have long been caught up amongst the raging fires of warfare. And urban centres have long been the target for military operations.

Stalingrad anyone? The Battle for Berlin? The fighting in Moscow at the greatest extent of the German penetration into Russia? The siege of Bastogne? The battle of Arnhem? And these are just the famous examples, the ones that stand out most in the history books. But during the course of the war in the east and the allied invasion of Italy and then France countless towns were fought over, won, lost, won again, lost again.

The English civil war, while perhaps more famous for some of its field battles and its end result, was basically a war of sieges. Far more people, military and civilian, were killed fighting over the possession of important towns than on the fields of Newbury, Marston Moor and Naseby. 

Urban operations have been the 'norm' for a very, very long time now. The technology in use has changed, as have the tactics, but the importance of urban areas hasn't. It just annoys me, the concept that somehow urban warfare is a 21st Century invention, along with counter insurgency wars no doubt. I'm sure someone, somewhere is right now writing a paper to present to congress about how the US army needs more of x and y shiny new kit in order to cope with this new "warfighting paradigm".

Rant over.

Sunday, 8 February 2015

Some Stuff I've been pondering this week

Evening all. Lot to get through in one sitting, but let's dive straight in.

First up is a story over at War is Boring about the USAF wanting to get rid of some of its EC-130H Compass Call aircraft (first saw this link over at Think Defence, brought up by user "TAS"). TAS made the jokey comment that we should all pitch in a few quid in order to buy some and naturally I agree because as anyone that has read this blog for any length of time will know, I loves a bargain so I does! 

And in all seriousness this does seem to be something of a bargain if it turns out to be the real deal. I say "if" because a classic budget trick used the globe over is to offer up something for being cut that you know damn well nobody will accept, and the Compass Call aircraft might very well fall into that. If not then it seems the USAF would genuinely be willing to mothball seven of its fleet of 15 aircraft, saving approximately $300 million over the next four years (which would seem to suggest an average running cost of about $10.7 million/£7.02 million per year, per aircraft).

Of course instead of just saving money they could make some cash, by selling them to us friendly Brits! Although the Compass Calls are laden with secret squirrel kit it shouldn't be too much of a problem to get authorisation for a sale, not least because the UK has just started taking delivery of the new Airseeker aircraft, which are basically the same as the USAF Rivet Joint. The two countries have a long history of sharing sensitive information and knowledge, and this sale would offer the USAF the additional benefit of keeping these helpful aircraft in service, albeit now in UK hands.

And I think a purchase would make a lot of sense for the UK. Here is the chance to snap up a massive capability leap for the RAF at a bargain basement price. The base Hercules aircraft itself is already in RAF service so a pool of trained pilots, ground crews and spares already exists. What doesn't exist in the RAF anymore is a strong Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) capability, not least since the ALARM missile was retired. 

Supposedly this will be covered in the future by a mixture of using the F-35's radar as a jammer along with various guided munitions, but I think a dedicated aircraft like Compass Call, with the ability to jam radars, communications and just about any other electronic signal that you can think of, would be a real boon to UK forces. As was pointed out in the War Is Boring article these aircraft have served over Iraq and Afghanistan and represent a handy little tool to have around, being useful in both full scale conventional campaigns and smaller scale "COIN" wars and interventions, such as the current operations taking place over Iraq against ISIS.

The US want shot of some of theirs, we could make good use of some, so I'm sure if the powers that be wanted then a good deal could be accomodated. That is of course providing the treasury plays ball. And that's the real sticking point, in that government budgets are nothing if not inflexible. While we routinely here about money being found for new projects, typically a short investigation yields a revelation that in fact the money has just been jigged around a little and that the "new" spending is simply planned work being pulled forward from later years (as happened recently due to a £900+ million underspend by the MoD). 

It's not purely an MoD problem, its been well documented across government that there is a lack of flexibility in budgeting and as a result an inability for ministers and their civil servants to pounce on deals like this. We can dream I guess!

Now, from that same War is Boring article I noticed that the USAF is still touting the $550 million (£361 million) price tag for its planned Long Range Strike Bomber. This seems rather odd/laughable to me, because the USAF doesn't exactly have a sterling track record of delivering programs to their budgeted time and cost profiles. It's likely to be made harder by all the requirements I see kicking about.

Because one of the problems with a project like this is that because it's always going to be quite expensive in the first place, people have a tendency to start demanding it perform a host of other side roles in order to obtain value for money. As the requirements expand, so does the amount of crap that the aircraft is required to haul around. This adds to cost, which tends to drive down the unit numbers, which encourages more people to add yet more shit to them to make them yet more multi-role, and so the spiral continues, till you end up with one aircraft that can practically fight a war by itself, but only at the expense of the rest of the air force.

Having learned absolutely nothing from the past it already seems the USAF is heading down this path. Given some of the things that people seem to expect the LRSB to be capable of in the future, then at the current rate it will eventually just be a massive collection of radars glued together with a big dollop of hope, with enough space for a handful of bombs somewhere in the middle.

It really doesn't have to end up like that. A new design that is a little more "stealthy" compared to the B-2, a set of engines (there are plenty of options available) and re-use the radar from the F-35, and Bob's your uncle. Just build a bomber, not a death star and the $550 million per aircraft cost should be more than achievable. At this stage it's a viable and successful project just waiting for someone (or several people) to come along and f**k it up!

Back in the UK and we have a general election looming, in case you didn't know from all the wall to wall media coverage which is only going to get worse as we approach May the 7th. What I found amusing though was a big push being made by the MoD to get more service personnel to vote, with the revelation that around 1/3 of the armed forces are not on the electoral register. It seems to me a rather cruel campaign in a sense, to encourage members of an organisation that has seen thousands of cutbacks delivered by successive governments to then vote for them. Politicians it would seem still have no sense of tact and never miss the chance to grab a few headlines.

Every now and again though politicians do finally do something right. After all, even a broken clock tells the right time twice a day. And on that note £500,000 from the fines imposed on banks as part of the LIBOR rigging scandal will be given to the Fly Navy Heritage Trust in order to help them carry out repairs on a pair of Fairey Swordfish aircraft. Some of the money will also be used to build up a supply of spares. You can read more about that here on the Royal Navy's website.

And finally the local hooligans of the 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, have been off tearing up the Stanford Training Area in Norfolk, exercising as a battle group along with engineers in order to seize a simulated airfield. All this is part of a build up to a six-week joint exercise in the US with part of the 82nd Airborne division. Which raises a question in my mind.

My question goes as such; what is the purpose for II Squadron, RAF Regiment?

I've long stood up for the purpose of the RAF Regiment. I think history has demonstrated its utility and the manpower allocation for the task is actually quite small in the grand scheme of things. But in turn I've shared some of the criticism that some have for it, such as the oddity of not having a squadron permanently deployed (on a rotating basis) to the Falklands Islands, which is arguably the one airfield the UK operates that is always at some degree of risk of precisely the kind of attack which the RAF Regiment is designed to prevent.

II Squadron is the massive oddity in the pack though. Aside from being able to serve as a regular field squadron it's also trained for parachute jumps, ostensibly giving it the capability to capture forward airfields by air assault. But the practicality of what is basically just a reinforced company seizing and holding an entire airfield is somewhat up for debate. Indeed the Parachute regiment, able to deploy whole battalions plus support would seem like a much more viable option if such a task were required.

Which rather leaves II Squadron up in the air from my perspective (no pun intended). Options for its future would seem to sit into three broad categories; 1) disband, 2) retain and attach to 16 Air Assault Brigade, with the purpose of securing landing zones (even just for resupply) while the rest of the brigade would move off to extend its operations, 3) retain and re-role.

Re-role to what though? 

Well one possibility might be to turn it into a dedicated Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) unit. The horrific execution of a Jordanian pilot captured by ISIS provides us with a stark reminder of one of the many dangers faced by RAF and allied pilots when conducting operations over enemy held territory. The morale effect of knowing that help would be on hand should the pilot get into trouble and have to eject should not be underestimated, nor should be the propaganda value of captured pilots. It's also worth remembering how expensive it is and how long it takes to train prime quality pilots.

A CSAR unit built around II Squadron would prove quite handy I think. Clearly it could be given other tasks on the side if needed, but primarily it would be dedicated to the CSAR (and support to peacetime SAR) role in much the same way as the USAF's Pararescuemen are (incidentally it was the UK that essentially invented the concept of CSAR from the air in 1915 when Richard Bell-Davies of the Royal Navy Air Service rescued his wingman by landing his aircraft and picking him up from under the nose of the enemy, receiving the Victoria Cross in the process).

Such a unit would need a bit of equipment diverted its way, and I understand that in the current budget climate that's another strain that defence could do without, but I think it would be another small capability uplift that could have a big impact in the grand scheme of things.

Monday, 26 January 2015

The Kawasaki P-1

Some of the latest small talk ahead of the 2015 SDSR (post upcoming) is that the UK might consider purchasing the Kawasaki P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) from Japan. The Japanese have not long since removed their self-imposed ban on defence exports which would now allow them to sell the P-1 to countries like the UK. And boy does the UK need a new MPA aircraft.

But while the potential of such a purchase has garnered a lot of attention and speculation (and as yet nothing even approaching a public suggestion of interest from the MoD) it also faces a number of issues. The P-1 is so far exclusive to Japan. It has no other orders on the books. Therefore the support infrastructure would exist only in Japan at the start and unlike the Boeing P-8 Poseidon there would not be a global customer base to defray purchase and support costs, not least because the engines are bespoke to the aircraft.

Of course that could change. Kawasaki wants to use the P-1 as the basis for a regional airliner to compete with the likes of Boeing and Airbus, and if that happened then some support costs for the P-1 would fall. There is also the potential for the P-1 to become an export success in its own right, but who would take that first leap of faith and become the first export customer? The UK maybe?

Well I'm a big fan of the philosophy of "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours". You do something for me, I'll do something for you. And I think just such an opportunity exists with the P-1. Clearly for the Japanese any additional P-1 sales to a foreign customer are a bonus in their own right, but if one country were to take that first leap then it could potentially ease the concerns of others and make the P-1 seem like a more viable option on the global market. And of course we need a brand new MPA.

So why not propose a deal? Start by agreeing a fair and normal price for an order of P-1s, but then add a little twist, either; 1) the Japanese subsidise part of the cost of the UK's purchase, a subsidy that would be paid back in instalments in the future if the P-1 doesn't hit off on the international market, or 2) the UK pays the full price up front, but any future orders by another nation trigger "thank you" payments to the UK for being the first foreign customer, up to a fixed cap.

That way the Japanese only lose out on the deal if other countries follow the UK's lead, but even that is obviously a win for the Japanese. And the UK either ends up paying a fair price for the P-1, which is fine, or it ends up getting a great deal in exchange for having paved the way as the first foreign customer. You scratch my back, I scratch yours.

Or we could just do the normal running for the MoD and pay over the odds...